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I
Gaius Marius’ military reforms caused more problems for the Roman Republic than any
enemy of Rome ever could. Marius’s reforms were created to strengthen the Republic by
professionalizing Rome’s military, but instead the political impact of the reforms had long term
consequences that helped contribute to the decline of the late Roman Republic. In this paper the
decline of the Roman Republic refers to the weakening of the Senate’s authority over Rome’s
military and generals. The reform with the biggest impact was the opening up of the military to
the capite censi or landless poor. In passing this reform Marius opened up the military to Rome’s
largest class, but it created problems for the Republic, in the form of what to do with the men
once they retired from active duty. Marius believed that he solved the issue of what to do with
the retired men, when he made a deal with the Senate to give his troops plots of land on
retirement. Instead of fixing the problem, Marius opened the door for other generals to use the
giving of land to manipulate their troops into supporting their political ambitions.
Marius did not use his troops to gain political power, but his reforms allowed other
generals to test their troop’s loyalty. After the Social War generals began to realize they had the
complete loyalty of their troops. Lucius Cornelius Sulla was the first general to realize he could
use his troops for his own political ends and he capitalized on it by marching his forces on Rome
in 88 and 82 BC. Sulla’s success at marching on Rome started a ripple effect causing other
generals to imitate his actions, by using their legions as their own political weapons to help
advance their political careers.
After Marius soldiers relied on their generals to provide them with an opportunity to gain
loot and to provide them with land upon retirement. The generals relied on their troops to give
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them complete loyalty and to support them in their goals to gain political power. Due to Marius’s
reforms the loyalty of the Roman legions started to shift away from the State in favor of the
generals. Since the State did not offer a retirement plan, the soldiers began to lose any loyalty
they felt to the State. If a general did not offer his soldiers a chance at looting and therefore gain
their loyalty, the soldiers did not become loyal to the State, but instead tried to transfer to serve
under a new general, who looked out for his soldier’s interests. Sulla and Caesar were masters at
gaining their troops loyalty to the point where they had created their own private armies. Both
Sulla and Caesar knew the way to the troop’s loyalty was through wealth, which made them very
generous in their spoils of war.
The giving of land to retired veterans may not have been the best idea since the majority
of the troops were from the landless society, and they did not have the farming background that
allowed them to be successful on their new land. This becomes evident at the time of the Catiline
conspiracy, when Sulla’s veterans in Etruria became discontent and bankrupt.1 Even though the
giving of land may not have been the best pension plan, generals fought with the Senate to give
their troops land, and soldiers were loyal to generals who delivered on their promise of land
grants.
The two biggest imitators of Sulla were Catiline and Caesar. Catiline was unsuccessful in
his attempts, but Caesar was very successful and helped usher in a new era for Rome. This paper
examines three events where the political impact of Marius’s military reforms is most evident in
contributing to the decline of the Roman Republic. The three events are Sulla’s and Caesar’s
dictatorships, and the Catiline conspiracy. Marius’s military reforms contributed to the decline of
the Roman Republic by allowing generals to use the giving of land as a pension to gain the
1
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loyalty of the troops, whom they used as a political weapon against their enemies in order to gain
control of the State.
II
From the founding of Rome, up until the reforms of Marius in 104 BC, the Roman
military was a non professional army, made up of land owning citizens. The population was
organized into five classes, with the Equestrian class forming the sixth class. The Equestrian
class was composed of the wealthiest individuals, which allowed them to become cavalry
because they could afford the upkeep of having horses. The rest of the land owning population
fell into the five classes, based on wealth and served as infantry.2 The capite censi, or landless
poor, were not allowed to serve in the military, except for emergency situations. In the early and
middle Republic, the State did not supply arms and armor; it was up to each individual to supply
their own military equipment. The land owning populace had more to lose, which made them
willing to fight.
The citizens who qualified for enrolment in the military saw their participation in the
defence of the State as their civil duty, responsibility, and also as a privilege.3 These early
soldiers were loyal to the Republic. They held prominent places in society and once the fighting
was over they could go back to their farms and continue on with their lives. The campaign
season began in March and ended in October.4 The men were usually away fighting for a few
weeks to a few months at most and were able to return to their farms in time to finish the harvest.
Since these early soldiers were land owning citizens, they did not have to rely on their general to
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give them a piece of land upon retirement. They did not require any retirement plans, because
their farms and livelihood were waiting for them on their dismissal from service.
Most of the men were willing to leave their farms for a short time to fulfill their military
duty, due to the amount of booty they could gather in a campaign season. The troops were
allowed to keep all the loot they acquired, which became viewed as an incentive or financial
compensation for their military service.5 Most of the soldiers were able to return from military
service with money and goods that helped make up for the profits they lost while they were
away. As Rome began to expand into lands further away, the soldiers had to leave their farms for
longer periods, which put strains on the family left behind, who cared for the farm. Many farms
went into ruin, because there was no one left to harvest and replant. Others lost their farms to
ambitious neighbors, who used the time the man was away to buy the land from the struggling
family.6
Rome started to experience recruitment issues after the Second Punic War, when the
Republic started to acquire land outside of Italy. These new oversea areas required a standing
force to keep them loyal to the Republic. The military based on militia farmers was not designed
to be used to keep a standing presence overseas.7 The recruitment problem also stemmed from
public land being sold to wealthy members of the Senate between 180 and 170 BC.8 Members of
the Senate used the public land to create large farms worked by slaves, to produce cash crops,
such as olive oil and wine. These farms became known as latifundia and the Senators or wealthy
individuals who owned these were not concerned with feeding the city’s populace, but instead
used the farms to turn a profit.
5
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In order to fix the recruitment issues, the Senate lowered the military land requirements.
The army was brought back up to strength, but it was only a quick fix and did not permanently
fix the problem. The recruitment problem reappeared in 113 BC, when Germanic and Celtic
tribes, consisting mostly of the Cimbri and Teutoni people, started to migrate into Roman lands.
In their first encounter with the Cimbri, Rome experienced a disastrous defeat that almost cost
them a whole army. In 112 BC Jugurtha was fighting his two brothers for the control of
Numidia, which caused Rome to fight two separate wars at the same time.
The Senate saw the Germanic and Celtic tribes as the bigger threat, but was persuaded
against their better judgment by the Equites who saw more profit in the war with Jugurtha.9 The
Equestrian class was mostly involved in banking, money lending, tax collection, and the
execution of public contracts. They believed a war with Jugurtha would give Rome a better
position to profit from trade and investments in Numidia. The Equites found a tribune named
Memmius who was sympathetic to their cause and used him to use the powers of his office to
push their interests through. With the help from the tribune, the Equites were successful in
pressuring the Senate to declare war on Jugurtha in 110 BC.
Rome suffered a slow start in the war with Jugurtha, but by the end of 110 BC, Quintus
Caeciluius Metellus took over command of the war and gave Rome some victories. Metellus
proved to be a capable commander, but was unable to win the war quickly. Metellus’s inability
to end the war allowed his legate Gaius Marius to gain the consulship for 107 BC. As the new
consul Marius replaced Metellus as the commander in the war.
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III
Gaius Marius came from a wealthy family from Arpinum and was part of the Equestrian
class. It was not uncommon for men from his class to join the lowest ranks of the Senate and be
sponsored by a patrician house. Marius joined the military where he was an excellent soldier, and
was able to advance up through the ranks of the military. Marius became noticed by the Metellus
family, who sponsored him in his political career. Marius was an ambitious man, who desired to
gain the consulship. In 108 BC, an opportunity opened for Marius to run for the consulship.
When he asked Metellus if he could leave for Rome to seek the consulship, Metellus tried to talk
him out of it, which infuriated Marius.10 Due to ambition and anger to Metellus, Marius gained
the support of the troops and Equestrian businessmen by telling them he could end the war in
few days.11 Marius was also able to gain the support of the plebs, who were going through a
period of elevating new men.12 With the support of the Equites and the plebs, Marius was able to
gain the consulship in 107 BC along with full command of the war with Jugurtha.
In Sallust’s account of the Jugurthine war, he mentions the recruiting Marius conducted
before going back to Numidia: “he himself in the meantime enrolled soldiers, not according to
the classes in the manner of our forefathers, but allowing anyone to volunteer, for the most part
of the proletariat.”13 This recruiting from the capite censi seems to have been a necessity due to
the reappearance of the recruitment problem. Marius may have also wanted loyal soldiers with
him when he went to take command of the army that had been working with Metellus. The
recruitment of the capite censi, during the Jugurtha campaign was the first step in the direction
Marius was going to take Rome’s military during his second consulship. The Senate did not
10
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approve of Marius’s recruitment of the capite censi, but he had the support of the plebs and their
tribunes, which made him untouchable in the Senate.14
Marius was not able to end the war as quickly as he boasted, but he did end the war by
negotiating with Jugurtha’s father in law King Bocchus for the surrender of Jugurtha. Marius
sent his quaestor Lucius Cornelius Sulla to finish the negotiations and take Jugurtha off of
Bocchus’s hands.15 For his work Sulla claimed to have ended the war, which started the enmity
between him and Marius.
IV
Marius’s first order of business during his second consulship was the reorganization of
the military. Since Rome had suffered four major defeats at the hands of the Germanic and Celtic
tribes, Marius was facing an issue of not being able to recruit enough soldiers. In order to fix the
recruitment problem, Marius eliminated the land requirement opening up the military to any
Roman male citizen, enhanced military training by basing it off the techniques developed by
gladiators, replaced the three different soldier types with cohorts of men universally armed with
the Spanish short sword or gladius, and created the use of the eagle as the standard for all
legions.16 Marius’s reforms did exactly what they were meant to do, which was to
professionalize Rome’s military.
By eliminating the military land requirements, Marius opened up the military to the
largest class in Rome, the capite censi. In the past the capite censi were only allowed in the
military during emergencies, which allowed them to be a reserve force to be called up in time of
14

John Warry, Warfare in the Classical World (London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1995), 133.
Sallust, War With Jugurtha, 379.
16
Harriet I. Flower, The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Republic (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2004), 81.
15

8
need.17 The benefit of opening the military to the poor and landless class was that it allowed
Rome to greatly expand its military. The downside was that these landless troops had nowhere to
go after retirement. Unlike the days before Marius, where the military was composed of land
owning citizens, who could go back to their farms, the landless needed help from the State in the
form of retirement benefits. The most common form of retirement benefits was grants of land in
Italy and newly conquered territories.
The Senate never had to give land or any form of retirement to soldiers when the military
was composed of land owning citizens. With the capite censi making up the bulk of the military
the Senate did not realize they had to change their policy towards troop retirement, in order to
keep the loyalty of the troops. The Senate was set in its ways and refused to create a retirement
program for the troops. The Senate’s inability to change its policy towards the troops, allowed
the generals to step in and become the heroes by giving their troops land, which eventually
caused the soldiers to shift their loyalty from the State to the generals. Smith mentions this when
he says, “The soldiers felt an attachment to their general rather than to their country, and if he
failed to attract their loyalty, than the love of country did not fill the gap.”18
After the Germanic and Celtic tribes were defeated, Marius became the first general to
negotiate with the Senate for a retirement plan for his soldiers. Marius persuaded the Senate to
give his soldiers land, which he based off of the early Republic’s practice of giving distinguished
soldiers plots of land.19 With this one act and the reorganization of the army, Marius contributed
to the decline of the Roman Republic. The opening up of the military to the capite censi and the
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granting of land to his troops had political repercussions that plagued the Roman Republic until
its collapse in 30 BC.
The political repercussions of Marius’s reforms and the giving of land to his retired
troops are evident in the civil wars caused by ambitious generals and the discontented veterans
who could not make a living from farming. The generals became the middle men between the
troops and the Senate, and were looked on by their soldiers as looking out for their best interests.
The soldiers relied on their general to give them booty from the wars and a piece of land to retire
on and in return the generals wanted loyalty from their troops. Over time the legions shifted from
being the States’ armies to the general’s private army.20 Civil wars broke out between competing
general’s private armies, which played a role in weakening the Republic. The giving of land to
retired veterans may also not have been the best retirement plan, since many of the veterans were
originally from the landless class and did not know how to farm.21 Many retired veterans went
into debt and became discontented and used their military skills to become a threat to the
Republic. They became willing to march on Rome in order to fix their present situations.
As the generals realized that they had the complete loyalty of their troops Smith
mentions, “it suited the purposes of the general to use their support for his own political ends,
while it never seemed to the soldiers improper to allow themselves to become the tool of a
general whose chief anxiety was his own political power and prestige.”22 Rome’s legions became
political weapons to be used by the generals against their enemies. Marius set the stage for
ambitious generals to use their soldiers to help advance their own political careers, but Marius
did not use his soldiers to help him gain his seven consulships. Generals did not use their troops
20
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to help them gain political power, until after the Social War, when Lucius Cornelius Sulla
became the first general to march on Rome in 88 BC.
V
Lucius Cornelius Sulla was part of an old patrician family, the Cornelian. During Sulla’s
time the Cornelian family was on hard times and did not control the same wealth as the other
patrician families.23 In 107 BC Sulla was elected quaestor, which was the start of his political
career. Sulla became Marius’s quaestor and helped end the Jugurthine War. Sulla proved himself
a capable general in the war against the Germanic and Celtic tribes, and he made himself
available for a generalship during the Social War. In the Social War Sulla proved himself to be
one of Rome’s most able generals, which allowed him to gain the consulship for 88 BC. In 90
BC King Mithradates of Pontus decided he wanted to free people from Roman rule and attacked
the Roman providences in Asia Minor.24 In 88 BC the Senate agreed to give military command
to Sulla to deal with the threat.
Marius wanted the command against Mithradates, which caused him to use a tribunician
law to withdraw Sulla’s command, and had it transferred to himself. Sulla did not like the turn of
events and decided to use force to regain his command against Mithradates. He appealed to his
soldiers stationed in Campania to march with him on Rome in order to protect their interests,
since a war with Mithradates would provide booty for the troops and the general.25 Sulla seems
to have made his soldiers afraid that if he was replaced in the command against Mithradates
another legion would enjoy the spoils of Asia.26 Sulla’s officers did not like the idea of marching
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on Rome and refused, but the soldiers afraid of losing their opportunity at gaining spoils
encouraged Sulla to march. In 88 BC Sulla marched his army on Rome. Marius fled to North
Africa, where his veterans were living in retirement. Sulla used the presence of his troops in the
city to persuade the Senate to give him back the command against Mithradates.
After Sulla left Rome to fight Mithradates, Cinna came to power and aligned himself
with Marius. They both recruited armies and marched on Rome, to gain the consulship of 86 BC.
They were successful in gaining power in Rome, but the excitement seemed to have been too
much for Marius, who died shortly after he gained the consulship in 86 BC. Cinna took control
of Rome and declared Sulla an enemy of the State. Cinna recruited an army to fight Sulla, but
was murdered by his troops en route to face Sulla. Sulla defeated Mithradates in 84 BC and by
83 BC he was back in Italy with his army. Upon his return in Italy, Sulla was met by nobiles who
had suffered during Cinna’s reign; these nobiles included Marcus Licinius Crassus, and Gnaeus
Pompeius or Pompey.27 In 82 BC Sulla marched his army on Rome for a second time. This time
he made himself dictator and set about reorganizing the Senate.
Once Sulla became dictator in 82 BC he organized proscriptions against his political
enemies and posted the lists at the forum for all to see. According to Arthur Keaveney, Sulla saw
himself as the champion of the Senate and state and believed his task was to punish public
enemies in the form of the proscriptions, so Rome could become whole again. Sallust mentions
the proscriptions as a time of chaos, when people were murdering in order to gain the persons
items they desired, and the proscriptions did not end until Sulla made sure his supporters were
satisfied with riches.28 Sulla used a large sum of money for an ambitious building program. He
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expanded the forum, built theatres in different parts of Italy, and built temples all over Italy, with
the most elaborate temple belonging to Fortune.29 According to Plutarch, Sulla held great
banquets for the people, where so much food was presented that large quantities were thrown
into the river.30 The banquet lasted for several days and the main purpose of the banquet seems
have been an attempt by Sulla to reconcile with the people and to assure them their troubles were
over.31
Sulla was the first general to realize the potential of Marius reforms, of using the military
to advance his own political gains, which were to regain the command against Mithradates and to
become dictator of the State. He was the master at using his troops as a political weapon against
his enemies. When in camp Sulla wandered around and mingled with his troops, which allowed
him to develop close relationships with his men.32 This close relationship allowed Sulla to gain
his troops affection and absolute loyalty. The military reforms of Marius made the decline of the
Republic possible, but it was Sulla who started the Republic’s decline. Sulla seems to have
noticed the damage he caused to the Republic, which would explain why he worked hard to
strengthen the Republic. He created a constitution that was designed to prevent a recurrence of
his own behavior.33 Sulla may have believed he was the only one who could fix the Republic and
keep it from going into further decline. It would explain why he became dictator and created a
constitution that tried to strengthen the Senate. It would also explain why he gave up his
dictatorship after his constitution was in effect.
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By Sulla’s time different parts of the government, such as the tribunate, had evolved from
their original purpose into something with more power, which threatened the wellbeing of the
State. Sulla recognized this and made it his duty to restore the government back to its original
state. Sulla restored the office of tribunate back to its primitive form, by eliminating its power to
pass legislation, and its power to summon the Senate. Sulla also curbed the tribunates power to
veto. Sulla worked to prevent other generals from marching on Rome by making it treason if a
governor did not step down within thirty days of the successor’s arrival, if a governor led an
army outside of their province, entered an allied kingdom, or started a war without the Senate’s
consent.34
Sulla tried to prevent an individual’s rapid rise through the political offices and their
holding of repeated offices, by creating a law called the lex Cornelia annalis, which forced a
person to proceed from office to office in a fixed order.35 Sulla strengthened the Senate, which
was weakened, due to his proscriptions, by increasing the Senate from 300 to 600. Sulla saw his
march on Rome and his dictatorship as a necessary act in order to strengthen the weakening
Republic. Once Sulla felt his reforms had strengthened and restored the Republic to their former
glory, he was willing to relinquish the dictatorship.
Instead of fixing the Republic, Sulla’s dictatorship showed other ambitious generals how
to use their army, to gain political advancement. After Sulla the desire for plunder made the
soldiers were more willing to follow their generals into civil wars regardless of the cause the
general represented.36 Sulla seems to have realized that his actions would be imitated, which
caused him to settle the majority of his veterans in Italy as a safeguard to provide the Senate with
34
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a force to defend against any imitators. Sulla failed to realize that his veterans would provide the
force for any imitator. He did not account for his veterans going into debt and being willing to
support anyone who promised them plunder and a way out of debt. Instead of protecting the
Republic, Sulla’s veterans later contributed to its decline by supporting Catiline in his
conspiracy. Sulla’s dictatorship ended the days of loyalty to the Republic. Smith states, “Rome,
with the Senate at the head, could no longer command the allegiance of Romans.”37
The 60s BC was a time of political corruption and indebtedness on a grand scale. During
Sulla’s dictatorship, he confiscated the land and uprooted many small farmers in Etruria, in order
to give the land to his veterans.38 This caused a migration of poor landless farmers to Rome,
which created problems for the Republic, starting in the 60s. Selfishness and dishonesty became
all too common and this led to gross materialism and extravagance, which became all the rage
for the patricians and plebian’s. It became common practice for people to live outside their
means as stated by Smith, “luxurious villas and town houses ate up fortunes; millions of
sesterces were spent on the pleasures of the table and on highly qualified slaves.”39 Bribery
during elections was also a common event, with people going into debt because of spending too
much on bribes. Being in debt became almost a fashion statement during this time.
During Sulla’s rule he filled Rome’s treasury from the profits he made during the war
with Mithradates and from the vast amounts of wealth he gained from the proscriptions. His
soldiers came back loaded with loot and his supporters during the proscriptions became very
wealthy very quickly, which seems to have flooded Rome with wealth. As people became rich
overnight they started to flaunt their newly acquired wealth, by hosting extravagant dinner
37
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parties and buying luxury goods. This new fashion of uncontrolled spending seems to have been
on a crash course with disaster that culminated in the debt crisis of the 60s. Walter Allen
believed the debt crisis was caused by large amounts of gold and silver being exported out of
Rome, which caused money to be tight and increased interest rates on loans.40 According to
Allen the money was being invested in the newly conquered territory of Mithradates, since the
possibility of exploitation during reconstruction was high.
VI
Allen’s explanation seems very plausible, but it is also worth looking at Sulla’s veterans
for an answer. Sulla’s veterans gained sudden wealth in the form of loot, which caused them to
gain a taste for luxury. Once they retired they could not drop their taste for luxury, which caused
them to build big fancy farms, have vast amounts of slaves, and host luxurious banquets, which
drained their wealth and caused them to go into debt.41 It seems very likely this is what happened
too many of the people in Rome, who gained their wealth suddenly. Many of the people were not
used to having vast wealth or living an extravagant and luxury lifestyle. Once they gained their
wealth they became fond of their new life style, which caused them to spend all of their money.
Once their money was gone they did not want to give up their lifestyle or did not know how,
which caused them to go into debt.
In 66 BC Lucius Sergius Catilina returned to Rome from his governorship in North
Africa. Catiline was from an old patrician family, who had fallen on hard times. Catiline had
strength of both body and mind, but was cunning and desired heights beyond his reach.42 He

40

Walter Allen, Jr., “In Defense of Catiline,” The Classical Journal 34, no. 2 (Nov. 1938): 72.
Cicero, In Catilinam I-IV-Pro Murena-Pro Sulla-Pro Flacco, trans. Louis E. Lord (London: Harvard University
Press, 1964), 20.
42
Sallust, War With Catiline, 9.
41

16
aligned himself with Sulla during Sulla’s dictatorship, which allowed him to profit from the
proscriptions. Catiline used his new wealth to bribe his way to a governorship in North Africa.
On his return from North Africa, he decided to act on his urge to capture the commonwealth and
was willing to use any method to do it as long as he acquired kingship. Catiline was incited by
the corrupt morals prevalent in Rome, caused by luxury and avarice.43 He decided to use the
corrupt morals and political strife to his advantage in his attempt to capture the commonwealth.44
In 66 BC Pompey left Rome to fight Mithradates, who rebuilt his forces and was again
trying to free the Roman provinces of Asia Minor. While Pompey was away in the East, there
was a general fear in Rome of what Pompey would do when he returned victorious.45 The Senate
feared Pompey would follow in the footsteps of his mentor Sulla and march on Rome with his
army. This fear seems to have been what encouraged Pompey’s rival Marcus Licinius Crassus to
establish a base of power in Rome. Crassus’s goal during this time was to gain an army in order
to oppose Pompey when he returned. Crassus joined with Gaius Julius Caesar in trying to pass
reforms that would give him his army. Marcus Tullius Cicero was Pompey’s biggest ally in
Rome and he stopped the reforms of Crassus and Caesar from being passed. With the failure of
their reforms, Crassus gave his support to Catiline with the hopes of having a consul in office
that was favorable to his plans.46
Catiline desired the consulship, but was unable to run for the office the year he returned,
due to charges of extortion brought against him by his province.47 Extortion was a common
charge many governors faced when they returned to Rome and bribery was the common method
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of getting out of trouble.48 Many used the money they gained during their governorship to bribe
the courts to let them go. Catiline was able to bribe the court to drop the charges against him, but
lost most of his wealth in the process. Catiline was like any other patrician during his time, in
that he used his wealth to show off his class standing. He hosted huge dinner banquets that were
meant to show off his wealth and he lived a lavish lifestyle, which quickly drained what little
wealth he had. The loss of his wealth made him go into debt, which caused him to desire the
consulship even more.
In 64 BC Catiline was taken to court again for participating in the Sullan proscriptions.
Caesar was one of the men presiding over the court and he used his support to have Catiline
acquitted of all charges.49 With his acquittal Catiline was able to become a candidate for the
consulship in 63 BC. Catiline’s rival for the consulship was Cicero, who was a new man from
the equestrian class. Catiline played on the political strife to gain the support of the “dissatisfied
and discontented.”50 He supported a debt cancelation program that gained him the support of the
indebted lower class and indebted Sullan veterans. Indebted farmers and Sullan veterans from
Etruria were Catiline’s most vocal supporters. He also gained the support of indebted patricians
like himself, who were looking for a quick and easy way to get out of debt.
Catiline lost the elections for 63 BC to Cicero, who was able to gain the support of the
equestrian class and the Senate. For Catiline, having the support from Crassus, Caesar and the
indebted was not enough. Catiline was not ready to give up his desire of the consulship and ran
for the consulship for 62 BC. Catiline’s inability to win the consulship for 62 BC seems to have
motivated him to start his conspiracy of using force to advance his political career.
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In his second oration against Catiline, Cicero talks about six classes of people who
supported Catiline. The first class was composed of people who were in debt, but had enough
possessions worth more than their debt. They were not willing to sell their possessions in order
to get out of debt, which causes Cicero to call them the most shameless.51 The second class was
composed of indebted men, who planned to use the confusion caused by Catiline to gain supreme
power for themselves. The third class consisted of Sulla’s veterans who were disgruntled at the
loss of their wealth and their inability to make a living from farming. The fourth class was
composed of men who had gone into debt, due to their extravagant lifestyle and laziness to try to
fix their situation.52 The fifth class was composed of assassins and bandits and the last class was
composed of indebted patricians like Catiline, who made up his bodyguard and preferred to party
and gamble all night.
Catiline was able to gain the support from the veterans and indebted populace because he
offered a plan that was aimed at alleviating the debt problems at the expense of the money
lenders. Debt cancellation or reduction of debts may not have been the best plan, because the
people who were smart with their money and loaned money like Crassus, would have been the
ones who suffered under the plan. Cicero seems to have realized this, which is why he fought
hard to protect the patricians and plebs not in debt and the State’s interests.53 Catiline’s main
reason for supporting the debt cancelation program was because he was in debt and he may have
noticed he could kill two birds with one stone. By supporting the program he could not only fix
his debt problem, but also become the hero for the debt ridden populace, which would gain him
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the support he needed in his bid for the consulship. After he lost the elections he was still seen as
the hero by the indebted veterans and farmers who were willing to support his conspiracy.54
VII
In 63 BC Catiline’s conspiracy is another good example of the political impact of
Marius’s military reforms. Rome not only had to worry about the active military marching on the
city, but after Catiline Rome had to deal with veterans marching on the city. Giving land grants
to retired soldiers may not have been the best pension plan. R.E. Smith makes this clear when he
states, “Since many of the veterans would have had no experience of the land, it was possible
that both socially and economically it was unsound; and the discontent of Sulla’s veterans at the
time of Catiline’s conspiracy suggests that it was not universally satisfactory.”55 Many of the
veterans who were given land in Etruria went into debt, from either buying supplies necessary
for the farm or because they did not know how to make a lively hood from the land.
Many of Sulla’s veterans had a love for extravagance and luxury, due to their days
stationed in Asia.56 While they were in Asia they gained vast amounts of loot that allowed them
to live like lords. Once they retired on their farms, they could not break their acquired habits and
squandered their wealth on luxury goods. With this taste for luxury and extravagance, many of
the veterans had a hard time adjusting to a farmer’s life. Many of Sulla’s veterans sold their
farms and relisted, in order to gain more loot. The ones, who stayed and went into debt, were
looking for a way to relive their military life and for a way to acquire more loot. Catiline gave
them the opportunity they were looking for, which would explain why they were willing to
march with him on Rome.
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According to Appian the main goals of Catiline’s conspiracy were to start military
rebellions across the Italian country side, murder Cicero and other leading Senate members and
set fire to the city in order to incite fear and panic, so his troops would have an easier time in
marching on the city.57 Catiline gained support from indebted patricians, who were willing to
carry out the murders and set fires across the city. Gaius Manlius served under Sulla and became
a staunch supporter of Catiline, who rallied the disgruntled and indebted Sullan veterans to
Catiline’s cause. These Sullan veterans became the back bone of Catiline’s armed forces.
Catiline was one of Sulla’s supporters during the civil war and seems to have been
present in Rome when Sulla marched on the city. Catiline used his good relations with Sulla to
prosper from the proscriptions. Catiline was present and prospered from Sulla’s dictatorship and
according to Odahl, “aware of the careers of Marius, Sulla, and Pompey, Catiline realized that he
would need military support both to gain and retain power.”58 Catiline may have thought using
force worked for Marius, Sulla, and Pompey, so why would it not work for him?
Catiline seems to have also adopted Sulla’s idea of proscriptions, because Sallust
mentions how Catiline’s supporters asked him how they would benefit from his march on the
city. Catiline replied that he would conduct proscriptions against the wealthy, magistracies, and
priesthoods and he would allow them to seize anything else they desired.59 Catiline was
desperate to restore his wealth and was willing to follow in the foot steps of Sulla to achieve his
goals. Catiline did what Sulla was trying to prevent in his new constitution, which was imitating
his march on Rome. Sulla placed his veterans in Italy for the sole purpose of protecting Rome
from imitators, but Catiline was able to play on their debt problems in order to manipulate them
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to march with him on Rome. The only men in Italy with the experience of marching on Rome
became the backbone of Catiline’s forces.
Like Sulla, Catiline used veterans as a means of achieving supreme power in Rome.
However, he did not want to gain supreme power in order to strengthen the Republic; he wanted
to bring the Republic to an end, in order to be the sole ruler of Rome.60 It seems Catiline believed
if he became the ruler of Rome than he would have access to the treasury, which would allow
him to continue his extravagant lifestyle and his days of debt would be no more. The veterans
seem to have been willing to support Catiline in his conspiracy, because he was giving them one
last chance to pillage and regain their lost fortunes. The plebians seem to have supported Catiline
because he offered them a chance at a revolution to increase their social standing. This can be
seen in Sallust: “meanwhile Manlius in Etruria was working upon the populace, who were
already ripe for revolution because of penury and resentment at their wrongs; for during Sulla’s
supremacy they had lost their lands and all their property.”61
VIII
Catiline’s conspiracy was a failure, due to the work of Cicero, who called Catiline out
and dismantled the conspiracy before it could begin. Cicero had a mole in the conspiracy, who
kept him up to date on the plans of the conspirators.62 He used his information to create fear to
persuade the Senate of the danger Catiline posed. In order to create fear, Cicero called a Senate
meeting, where he gave certain Senators letters and had them read the letters out loud, which
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exposed the conspiracy.63 This had the desired affect Cicero wanted because the Senate gave
their full support to Cicero in stopping the conspiracy.
Cicero used the fear that he created to round up the suspected conspirators and have them
executed without a fair trial. The suspected conspirators were Publius Cornelius Lentulus, Gaius
Cassius Cethegus, Lucius Statilius, Publius Gabinius Capito, and Caeparius.64 Rome had laws
that protected Roman citizens from being executed without a fair trial, but Cicero was able to get
around the laws by invoking the senates consultum ultimum. The senates consultum ultimum was
the Roman form of martial law that could be enacted by the Senate in times of emergency.
Cicero believed it would protect him from any illegal action he was about to commit of
executing Roman citizen’s without a fair trial. What sealed the conspirator’s fate were the
weapons that were found in Cethegus’s house. Cethegus claimed the weapons were collector’s
items, but they were all the proof Cicero needed to seal their fates.65After the conspirators were
executed Cicero persuaded the Senate to use the armies that were left in Italy to attack Catiline’s
makeshift army. Catiline was caught off guard by the Senate’s sudden aggressiveness and was
forced to fight one of the Senate’s armies. Catiline was killed along with most of his forces in the
fighting, which effectively brought an end the Catiline conspiracy.
The Catiline conspiracy is an important event in the late Roman Republic because it is a
good example of the political impacts of Marius’s reforms and Sulla’s dictatorship. The
recruitment of the capite censi allowed generals to more easily manipulate their troops to fulfill
their ambitions for political power.66 The new landless troops had more needs than the previous
land owning troops; this allowed the generals to play on the needs of their troops in order to gain
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their loyalty and support in their goals for political power. Sulla allowed his troops to live in
luxury during their time in Asia and when he gained the dictatorship he flooded the city with
wealth, which eventually led to the indebtedness and discontent of the 60s BC. Once his troops
gained a taste for extravagance and luxury, they had a hard time settling down on their modest
pieces of land.67 Most of the troops could not bring themselves to live a modest life and instead
spent all of their wealth on their extravagant lifestyle. Once the wealth was gone, they became
willing to enter the political arena on the side of Catiline, in order to regain their wealth, so they
could continue to live their extravagant lifestyle.68
After the conspiracy was put down Cicero made it known that he was the savior of the
Republic and he believed that the proper functioning of the Republic had been restored.69 Cicero
was going to discover with the return of Pompey in 62 BC that his faith in the restored Republic
was unfounded. Pompey shocked everyone when he disbanded his army on his landing in Italy.
Pompey proved he was not like Sulla, by following the Senate’s rules of disbanding his army.
The Senate seems to have gained confidence from Pompey’s actions, because they were not
willing to work with him in giving the land pension to his troops.70 Pompey continued to argue
with the Senate about receiving land for his troops, until Caesar’s arrival from Spain in 60 BC.
IX
Gaius Julius Caesar returned from his governorship in Spain in 60 BC and immediately
put himself forward as a candidate for the consulship of 59 BC. Once in Rome, Caesar learned of
Pompey’s problems with the Senate and made a private deal with Pompey and Crassus to gain
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their support. Caesar offered to help Pompey with his pension problem once he was consul, in
exchange for Pompey’s and Crassus’s support.71 This was the beginning of the First Triumvirate,
which came into power in 59 BC.
The First Triumvirate was a private alliance between Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus.
Caesar was instrumental in the forming of the First Triumvirate, because he acted as the mediator
between Crassus and Pompey. The enmity between Crassus and Pompey went back to the days
of Sulla when Pompey received more recognition from Sulla than did Crassus.72 Once Caesar
helped the two get over their feud, their partnership became very profitable for the three. Due to
the support from Pompey and Crassus, Caesar was able to gain the consulship and in return he
helped Pompey receive pensions for his troops.
Caesar’s co-consul was Calpurnius Bibulus who resisted Caesars agrarian proposals that
were designed to give land to Pompey’s troops. Caesar used violence and forced Bibulus into an
early retirement from the consulship. This was Caesar’s first use of violence in politics, but it
was not his last. During their alliance Caesar and Pompey routinely used their soldiers and
veterans to help pass legislations and decide elections.73 The veterans and soldiers were used by
Pompey and Caesar to provide support necessary for the legislations to pass. The veterans and
soldiers were also used to support the individuals who could be controlled by the triumvirate.
The use of soldiers by the First Triumvirates is a good example of the continued change of the
Roman military after Marius’s military reforms. By the time of the First Triumvirate it was
common for soldiers to be active participants in politics, by becoming the clients of their general.

71

Ibid., 62.
Odahl, Cicero and Catilinarian Conspiracy, 21.
73
Nippel, Public Order in Ancient Rome, 49.
72

25
If the soldiers retained any loyalty to the State then it seems very likely they would have been
repulsed by the idea of manipulating politics to favor their general.
During Caesar’s consulship he arranged to receive the governorship of Cisalpine Gaul,
Illyricum, and Gallia Transalpina for five years.74 Before Caesar’s consulship Germanic tribes
were on the move in Gaul looking for new land and this migration was very similar to the Cimbri
and Teutonic migration that Marius dealt with. The Germanic migration may have been the
reason why Caesar chose Gaul as his province, because he wanted to gain money and soldiers,
which Pompey proved was the best way to obtain political power.75 Caesar may have also been
familiar with Marius’s career and realized the best way to gain popularity was to put down a
barbarian threat. Over the next five years Caesar carved himself out a kingdom that made him
very wealthy. While he was away Pompey and Crassus controlled the Senate and protected his
interests.
In 56 BC Pompey and Crassus had themselves elected for their second consulships and
each received a province of their choosing. Pompey received Spain for five years and Crassus
received Syria.76 Crassus wanted Syria so he could expand his trade relations in the east and he
wanted to be like Pompey and Caesar in expanding the empire.77 His military efforts were
unsuccessful and he died at the hands of the Parthians in 53 BC.
With the death of Pompey’s wife and Caesar’s daughter Julia in 54 BC, Pompey lost her
influence, which seems to have kept him loyal with Caesar.78 Julia was well loved by both
Pompey and Caesar, which allowed her to influence Pompey to remain loyal to her father. The
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death of Crassus in 53 BC was the last tie that kept Pompey loyal to Caesar. After Crassus’s
death the triumvirate was no more and Pompey gained the majority of Crassus’s supporters,
which may have led him to believe that he had enough support to take charge of the republic.79
Pompey’s alignment with the Senate was the last bit of support he needed to turn against Caesar.
Pompey’s first move against Caesar was to pass a law that required governors to be elected from
ex-consuls and ex-praetors who had not held a governorship.80 This law stopped Caesar from
switching his governorship to the consulship without becoming a private citizen, thus making
him vulnerable to prosecution.
Caesar was threatened with prosecution before he left Rome to take over his
governorship of Gaul. He was being prosecuted for violations of vetoes, laws, and auspices
during his time as consul and the charges kept adding up during his governorship. He broke the
law created by Sulla, by taking his legions out of Gaul to pursue a war with the Germanic,
Gallic, and British tribes.81 When his governorship ended Pompey wanted Caesar to disband his
legions and return to Rome to face charges against him. Cicero stepped in to prevent a civil war,
by starting the negotiations between Caesar and Pompey.
Since Pompey and Caesar did not trust one another the negotiations were not successful
and ended with the Senate getting involved by declaring Caesar and enemy of the State. During
the negotiations with Caesar, Pompey made it clear to the Senate that he was the better
commander and could squash Caesar. Caesar’s enemies in the Senate believed him to be the
Catiline, who kept is intentions and villainy from being known.82 With Pompey showing
confidence in his ability to defeat Caesar and the attacks on Caesar in the Senate comparing him
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to Catiline, it seems the Senate felt strong enough to end the negotiations in favor of declaring
Caesar an enemy of the State. Once Caesar learned he was an enemy of the State, he seems to
have realized he had failed in his attempt to gain what he wanted through political means, which
caused him to use force by marching across the Rubicon in 49 BC.
Caesar, like Sulla, was the master at gaining his troop’s loyalty and using his army
against his political enemies. During Caesar’s time in Gaul, he increased his army from four to
twelve legions, by accepting non-citizen recruits from his region, whom he treated as full
citizens.83 Caesar’s treatment of his troops gained him their respect and trust. Caesar’s soldiers
served him to the limit of their endurance, because of the profit they made from the spoils of war
and from Caesar’s generosity.84 Caesar’s generosity allowed him to gain his troops loyalty and to
cultivate them for his own purposes, which they realized what the purposes were, but the money
was good and they continued to follow him.85 Caesar realized like Sulla that the way to the
troop’s loyalty was through wealth in the form of slaves and loot. As long as the soldiers profited
from Caesar’s generalship they were loyal and would follow him anywhere.
After Caesar crossed the Rubicon, Pompey fled with most of the Senate to Greece where
he could gather his loyal forces. Caesar gathered his ten veteran legions and followed Pompey.
The civil war in reality was a private war fought by Pompey’s and Caesar’s private armies. In 48
BC Caesar gained a decisive victory over Pompey at Pharsalus, in Greece, which caused Pompey
to flee to Egypt. In Egypt Pompey was murdered by Ptolemy XIII in the hope of keeping the war
out of Egypt and to gain favor with Rome.86 Pompey’s sons and supporters continued the war,
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until they were beaten in 46 BC. After the war in 46 BC, Caesar focused his attention on fixing
the damages he caused to the Republic, like what Sulla had done in 82 BC.
Like Sulla, Caesar used his forces to achieve political power, but once he gained the
power he acted very different than Sulla. Caesar did not go the Sullan route of proscriptions, but
instead offered to forgive everyone who supported Pompey in the war. Caesar was appointed
dictator for ten years and went about strengthening the Republic. Caesar realized the old
Republic was dead and went about reorganizing a new form of government. He wanted the
dictatorship to last an unlimited amount of time and he incorporated parts of the Republic that
best fit with his new style of government.87 There is a debate on what Caesars plans were for his
dictatorship, but it seems likely that unlike Sulla, Caesar had no intention of stepping down from
his dictatorship after he had repaired his damages to the Republic.
Caesars plans of reorganizing the Republic made him many enemies in the Senate, who
only wanted him to be dictator long enough to fix the problems in the Republic.88 Once they
learned he was not going to give up his dictatorship, they hatched a plan to murder him, in order
to preserve the Republic. In 44 BC prominent members of the Senate lead by Marcus Brutus and
Gaius Cassius Longinus, murdered Caesar. Brutus and Cassius believed that with Caesar’s death
they could restore the Republic to its former glory. Instead the death of Caesar started a power
struggle that claimed the lives of Brutus and Cassius and ended in the death of the Roman
Republic.
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X
Marius created the military reforms to fix the recruitment issues present in the 100s BC
and to professionalize Rome’s military. The capite censi were the largest class in Rome and the
opening of the military to them was seen as a permanent fix to the recruitment issues. Marius
realized his troops needed a retirement plan, since they did not own land to retire to. By working
with the Senate to give his troops land, Marius gained the gratitude and loyalty of his troops. The
Senate failed to realize they had to provide a retirement plan for the troops in order to keep the
loyalty of the legions. The Senate left it up to the generals to provide land for their troops, which
caused the loyalty of the legions to switch from the State to the generals. Marius’s military
reforms contributed to the decline of the Roman Republic, by allowing generals to use the giving
of land as pension to gain the loyalty of the troops, whom they used as a political weapon against
their enemies in order to gain control of the State.
Marius never realized the potential of his troops’ loyalty and did not use his soldiers to
help him gain his repeated consulships. Generals did not use their forces to gain political power
until after the Social War. Sulla was the first general to understand what could be achieved with
a loyal professional army, when he marched his forces on Rome in 88 and 82 BC. Sulla used his
army to put him at the head of the State in the position of dictator, which started the army’s
involvement in politics. After Sulla other generals imitated his rise to power, which greatly
contributed to the decline of the Roman Republic. Men like Catiline and Caesar both used
Sulla’s example of gaining political power.
Catiline was an indebted patrician, who only wanted to gain the consulship in order to
make money and get out of debt. He tried to gain the consulship the proper way, but when he
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failed to get elected, he resorted to the use of force to achieve his political ambitions. Catiline
was able to manipulate the forces that were meant to protect the State from Sullan imitators like
himself. Catiline played to the veterans’ debt problems in order to gain their support in his plans
to overthrow the Republic. Men such as Catiline were no longer respecting the power of the
Senate, which made them willing to use force to gain political power.
The decline of the loyalty to the Senate continued with Caesar, who fought a civil war
with Pompey, in order to become dictator of the State. Caesar, like Sulla and Catiline, tried to
gain power through political means and when that failed, he resorted to the use of force to
achieve what he could not through political means. Caesar, unlike Sulla, was unwilling to give
up his dictatorship, because he believed the Republic was no longer a valid way to govern an
empire.89 In Caesar’s eyes the Republic was dead and it was up to him to reorganize the
government in order to provide stability.90
Due to Marius’s military reforms the Senate lost the loyalty of the legions and once the
generals realized they could gain their troop’s loyalty by providing them with land and loot, their
loyalty to the State began to disappear as well. The desire for loot made the soldiers more willing
to follow their generals in civil wars, irrelevant of the cause they represented.91 Once the Senate
could no longer command the loyalty of its legions and generals, it became defenseless in
stopping powerful men such as Sulla and Caesar from taking over the government. The late
Roman Republic was in a steady decline before Marius, but Marius’s military reforms
contributed by increasing the decline of the Republic.
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